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The operational technology (OT) environment is a vital part of several businesses
around the world. While most of these businesses rely on the activities conducted
there in order to generate revenue, it is not always correctly secured, and it is treated
as a mere extension of the company’s IT network.
In this thesis it is described how OT-specific services were designed to protect the
company business while, at the same time, keeping into consideration the needs
of the people operating in the environment. It is also described how the design
was implemented in practice, describing the technology and the entities involved.
Finally, the use case definition and the testing phase is described to report what
kind of problem arose only later and how they were approached to be solved.
In short, this thesis follows the entire development of these services, starting from
the very beginning until the present moment, meaning the successful conclusion of
the testing phase and the start of the operational phase.
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In the last ten years, digitalization and innovation have profoundly changed the way
industries operate and conduct their businesses [1]. Thanks to constantly improving
information technology capability and the visible advantages, most companies have
started to connect more and more of their devices to exchange information more
quickly and optimize their processes [2].
A relatively new aspect that most companies now adopt is that IT does not
only serve the purpose of storing and computing pure information but is also used
for efficiently control and monitor various devices, including the ones that have
a tangible impact on the physical world [3]. For example, a diesel engine in a
power plant used to produce electricity cannot function autonomously without being
connected to a computer that monitors its performance and lets technicians tune it
and control various operational settings. In the past, that was not possible and not
needed, but today the constantly increasing requirements in performance, united
with the cost reduction for these systems, is making these examples more and more
common.
The hardware and software that detects or causes a change in industrial equip-
ment, assets, or processes is called Operational Technology (commonly abbrevi-
ated as OT) [4]. This definition is a guideline for defining what OT is. In practice,
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OT networks also involve all the software and hardware that supports the activities
above, even if it does not directly affect the industrial processes by itself [5].
The direct consequence of having industrial equipment connected and controlled
by software is that this same equipment becomes then vulnerable to cyber threats
that can violate the security of these devices and cause problems that can directly
affect the industrial process by disrupting it. As these machines often operate in
the same location as human personnel, the fact that a vulnerable device can directly
control moving parts makes clear the most significant risk in the OT environment.
An eventual security incident can cause people to get hurt or even lose their lives
with a financial and reputational loss for the victim company [6].
While this is by far the main concern for security specialists operating in this
domain, there is another huge aspect to consider. These are the potential costs that
a production plant would face if an incident in the devices or in the network would
cause the production activities to slow down or even stop altogether. Depending on
the plant size, this would amount to millions of euros per day in certain companies
[7].
As described above, the OT environment, even if at the general level, is com-
posed of very similar devices foundable in the more common IT environment (e.g.,
computers, network switches, firewalls, servers), has different risks and thus secu-
rity and operational requirements. Due to these fundamental differences, several
OT/ICS (Industrial Control System) security standards have been written during
the years. One of the most famous and widely adopted is IEC 62443 [8]. This
series of standards is composed of different sections and covers different aspects of
OT security, starting with defining basic terminology, explaining security require-
ments for the environment, and providing a risk-based approach for different parties
to recognize and mitigate the various risks that would arise.
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Standards like IEC 62443 (or NIST 800-82 [9]) are vital to follow for companies
to increase their security maturity and adapt to the constantly increasing security in-
cidents amount and resulting cost. However, implementing successfully the changes
required by best practices is easier said than done, and doing this usually requires
heavy changes in the infrastructure and the processes inside a company. Ignoring
this need would make the problem worse, and industries have started to address
this, even if the amount of work required to adapt legacy systems to continually
increasing security requirements demands many resources and time.
Another aspect that must be taken into account is that cybersecurity is never
done for cybersecurity itself. Instead, it should assist the business in successfully
conducting its operations without experiencing problems. The phrase above is a
crucial point, and it is also true in the OT environment. All the cybersecurity pro-
cesses that need to be implemented and maintained in this domain cannot ignore the
various needs that the business itself may have. It is quite the opposite: cybersecu-
rity must take the needs of the company representatives and implement measures to
satisfy these requirements while increasing the overall security of the environment
[10]. While it may seem an obvious point, it is a challenging topic because the best
solution from the cybersecurity point of view does not satisfy the business needs
and, vice versa, the most convenient option for a business would often not take into
account cybersecurity risks.
Business requirements are various, but in general their final goal is to have a
fully functional environment that has as little downtime as possible and can operate
without requiring additional workload [11]. In addition to this, the business site
prefers to be as much independent as possible in its decisions. This means that if a
change in the configuration of a particular device is needed, the shortest and fastest
way to perform it (so the one that involves fewer parties) is the one that it would
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choose. Often this means cutting out vital steps for cybersecurity, primarily the risk
analysis of the change in question, that would ensure that no security issue would
arise from the activity.
Of course, the need for the business side of being independent is related to the
fact that on the site level there are deadlines to honor, and these cannot always
be met if some issues put the production on hold waiting for another office to fix
the issue, instead of letting the local engineers solve it by themselves. For this, any
cybersecurity process oriented towards this kind of environment must be flexible
and optimized enough to ensure that cybersecurity practices would not slow things
down in a way that makes them counterproductive.
This thesis analyzes and shows how these cybersecurity services for the OT
environment were designed and developed in Wärtsilä. As these services are a new
trend for most companies, both big and small, this thesis highlights how the entire
development process took place, what were the findings and the changes that took
place during the development of the project, and also what were the issues that
arose during the testing phase, that forced the team to redesign certain aspects to
make the solution viable. This thesis serves as a guide to other companies that want
to bring or improve cybersecurity in their OT environment and provides insights
and findings from lessons learned to make the process easier and effective.
The rest of the thesis is composed as follow:
2. Background: In this chapter, it is analyzed if already existing IT solutions
are solving the needs of the OT environment properly. As the answer is ‘not
really’, the problem is introduced. There is a need to develop dedicated OT
solutions to address these requirements.
3. Requirements: This chapter describes in detail what are the requirements
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that must be kept into consideration while designing an OT solution. The
requirements address business needs by referencing the guidelines and best
practices to use in the OT security frameworks (IEC 62433).
4. Design: Here it is described how the different streams of the development
process took shape. OT NOC processes, OT SOC processes, OT Asset Man-
agement, OT PC management tools, OT remote connectivity, and supporting
activities are different streams that are described.
5. Implementation: Here it is described how the implementation process pro-
gressed and how multiple streams were handled while having a lot of integra-
tions and common dependencies between them. It is highlighted the complex-
ity of handling such big changes altogether and how collaboration between
different teams was vital for proceeding with the project.
6. Use Cases: After the implementation phase, before introducing the pilot
testing, it is described what are the use cases that were defined for the OT
services. It is introduced, for example, the role of SOC/NOC processes and
how internals and externals operate in various services.
7. Testing: This chapter covers how the solution performed in the pilot testing
in the company, how new problems arose, and how they were addressed. It also
describes how the various OT services behaved during the testing, if and how
they provided an added value in operational activities, and they are compared
on how this would have been handled if the solution would not in place to
highlight the real benefits that these bring.
8. Conclusions: This chapter wraps up what was observed during the entire
development process and provides ideas for future works. It also addresses any
non-solved problem, proposing at a high level how it might be addressed in the
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future. It also talks about the future of OT security and marks the importance
of developing new solutions for it, using the study above to illustrate how much
cybersecurity in a business can improve if addressed correctly.
2 Background
In chapter 1 it is introduced the topic of Operational Technology environment,
and it is explained how this is fundamentally different from a more natural IT
environment such as an office. However, it is not yet clear if already existing IT
cybersecurity services could provide a sufficient level of security maturity and at the
same time integrate correctly with business requirements, thus not requiring specific
development.
At the high level, it appears that the OT environment needs to be protected in
a very similar way to an IT environment. This means providing services that ensure
the security of the network and the security of the various devices connected to it.
It can be theoretically possible then to provide the same services already provided
to IT with slight adaptations. That would save time and resources, and if the result
were acceptable for both cybersecurity and business needs, it would not make sense
to invest in ad-hoc solutions.
Before analyzing what kind of solutions already exist, it is necessary to list the
OT environment’s needs. During the initial study, these requirements have been
identified:
• Need to properly identify and block malicious activity on the network that
could cause security incidents
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 8
• Need to ensure that the OT network operates continuously without disruptions
or low performance (e.g., packet loss, slow connection)
• Need to keep an accurate inventory of all the active devices present in the
environment to ensure that the various services keep the real environment into
consideration(or in other words “You cannot protect what you do not know”).
• Need to secure the endpoints from cyber attacks, in particular computers, that
are the most commonly attacked devices
• Need to provide a secure and reliable way for people and systems to connect
remotely, without sacrificing network security
2.1 Analysis of needs
It is now analyzed each of these requirements, highlighting how a traditional IT
approach would tackle the needs and its limits.
2.1.1 Need of proper identification and blockage of malicious
activity on the network that could cause security inci-
dents
Both in IT and OT, network attacks could cause different issues for the devices
operating in it. For this, there is the necessity of a service that monitors the network
24/7 and that can intervene in case a malicious activity is detected. The incident
response happens first by blocking the attacker from executing additional actions
and then removing the root cause that caused the incident to occur to avoid that
the attack is executed again.
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 9
Most companies address this demand by creating a Security Operation Center
(often referred to as SOC) [12]. A SOC takes care of both of the monitoring activities
as well as responding to incidents. The SOC operates 24/7 to ensure continuous
protection.
While this service itself is perfect for the OT domain also, there is a substantial
difference in how a network operates in an ICS environment versus how it operates
in an office one. For example, monitoring solutions that are designed for operating
in an IT environment are great in analyzing and detecting anomalies in a network
where most of the traffic is exchanged between computers, internal servers, and
cloud services (primarily). In an OT environment, vice versa, the devices that are
talking on the network are way more various and use very different protocols than the
ones most standard network monitoring solutions are supporting [13]. For example,
PLCs (Programmable Logic Controller) and SCADAs (Supervisory Control And
Data Acquisition) use protocols such as Profinet, Modbus, Profibus, and ControlNet.
These protocols are used to get data from automation machinery and also to control
them. It is then clear the importance of being able to detect if one packet that
travels on the network is malicious and would cause, for example, a PLC to disable
a safety device that needs to stay on. Another critical difference is how much more
alarming is an anomalous connection from or to the internet. In an office network,
most devices regularly exchange data with various resources around the internet
(imagine how many different websites a person visits during a regular workday). On
the other hand, in an OT environment, any connection between a local device and
an external resource must be fully known and allowed. While this does not make
sense in an office, on a factory floor, the simple detection of a never seen IP that
exchanges data with a local machine should be enough to raise alarms and people
to start investigating.
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2.1.2 Need to ensure that the OT network operates continu-
ously without disruptions or low performance
Having reliable network connectivity is vital for most systems, independently from
their purpose and what is connected to them. What is usually different is the priority
and the criticality for the network operativity itself.
Based on how fast the connectivity must be re-established in case of issues,
there are different approaches that a company can take to ensure that the network
stays operative even if some network devices fail. First of all, using a network
topology composed of redundant devices to ensure that the failure of one of them
would not cause the entire network to collapse. While this may be sufficient in most
environments, it cannot be a solution in the OT environment. Because the activities
in the factory are so heavily dependent on a fully functional network, there is a
necessity to introduce a dedicated Network Operation Center [14] (also called NOC).
A NOC can monitor the network 24/7 and intervene in case of issues, restoring as
quickly as possible the connectivity by monitoring and controlling network devices
such as switches, firewalls, or routers remotely.
This service has to be established with the right priorities kept in mind. As a
network outage might cause production activities to stop, and as we saw in chapter
1 this is one of the highest risks for the OT environment, a service like NOC must be
able to restore the connectivity very quickly at any time of the day or night. This is
because production activity can happen even during the night or weekend, and even
some minutes of network interruption could cause a severe problem in the factory.
For this, response times must be as low as possible, on the average way faster than
average IT network troubleshooting times.
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2.1.3 Need to keep an accurate inventory of all the devices
active on the environment
Keeping an accurate asset inventory for all IT assets of a company is a good security
practice well-known in the industry [15]. There are hundreds of ways to implement
this. However, the components that are most needed are a place to store all the
asset information and one (or more) ways to automatically gather data from assets
in the network to update the asset inventory automatically if some assets change
their attributes such as, for example, firmware version, or IP address.
While also this solution is existing for years for handling various IT devices,
depending on how each company has implemented it, it may be limited in its ca-
pabilities and not fully supporting the OT environment needs. One limitation, for
example, can be how the data model for each asset has been designed. If it does
not include essential attributes needed for cataloging OT assets (such as automation
device type or manufacturer), it can be less effective in displaying information about
various devices. Furthermore, the components that monitor the devices on the OT
network to gather their information and update the asset database need to be tuned
for the OT network. Similar to the situation of SOC (see section 2.1.1), the solution
must be able to understand the various packets traveling on the network even if the
protocols are not the most common ones. Also, most asset discovery solutions that
operate with IT devices (e.g., PCs, Servers) operate in active polling mode, meaning
that they contact device per device to ask them what their attributes are. That is
not possible on the OT network because such high polling activity would impact
negatively the performance of the network in a way that would be acceptable for an
office, but when this network is used to exchange time-sensitive packets that control
automation processes, this type of solution creates serious problems [16]. For this,
a different kind of scanning is needed, meaning a passive scan that detects asset
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information from what is gatherable by sniffing the regular network activity of the
device itself.
2.1.4 Need to secure the endpoints from cyber attacks, in
particular computers, that are the most commonly at-
tacked devices
Even in the OT network, computers are still a common target for attackers [17].
It can be said that as being the same type of device used everywhere else in the
company, it could be protected in the same way as all the other computers in the
other environments. However, this is far from true. While still being technically
identical, different computers may need different hardening policies based on how
and where they are planned to be used. The most straightforward example that can
be made is, again, the fact that office computers are expected to interact a lot with
the internet and with various files. For this, they must be protected from remote
attackers while still allowing certain freedom to its user. At the same time, it has to
be avoided that the PC user could execute potentially dangerous actions by limiting
his permissions (for example, by not conceding administrative rights).
On the other hand, OT computers, since they are designed to be installed and
used in a segregated OT network where internet access is limited to specifically
allowed resources, need to be hardened in a more robust way to restrict their usage
as much as possible. Their infection by a hacker could potentially cause him to
have direct access to the devices connected to that machine, such as PLCs that are
controlling physical processes. At the same time, factory technicians need to be
allowed to execute higher privilege actions on the devices when needed. While this
in an office scenario would require the raise of a ticket to authorized personnel that
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would execute the privileged action, for factory technicians, this step would cause
additional hassle that would increase process times. For that, privileged accounts
must be conceded to certain key people to conduct their business.
Finally, an OT-specific PC management service solves a big issue of many OT
environments: unpatched and vulnerable computers used in factory floors [18]. Usu-
ally, office computers in big companies are leased for a specific amount of years, and
they are changed frequently to keep them constantly updated to the latest system
version. This is not always the case for factories, as most computers there cannot
be substituted very often, which leads to a very heterogeneous amount of computers
that are difficult to keep protected as years pass. With a dedicated service that
addresses this issue by providing an OT-specific PC image and processes to support
their maintenance and lifecycle, this issue can be significantly reduced.
2.1.5 Need to provide a secure and reliable way for people
and systems to connect remotely, without sacrificing
network security
Remote access is a very particular need that most companies are facing, especially
since 2020 when the COVID-19 outbreak forced more and more people home and
created a strong need for solutions that allowed users to safely and reliably connect to
devices in the internal company networks without physically connecting to the LAN
[19]. This is a very critical aspect for cybersecurity because a not well implemented
remote connectivity solution would cause several potential incidents, from data being
intercepted by remote attackers to the worst scenario of having an attacker bypass
the authentication measures and connecting from the internet directly to a sensitive
local resource [20].
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Remote connectivity solutions are wildly adopted in IT environments, particu-
larly screen sharing solutions that allow a user to see and control a computer of
another user remotely. However, as they are implemented most of the time, they
are not sufficient to cover all the OT environment’s needs. This is because other
remote connectivity needs are not addressed by this, notably having zero trust ac-
cess. Zero trust approach means allowing external resources to access internal ones
implementing a proper authentication process to allow the connection [21]. The
most significant advantage is that, with this solution, almost every network integra-
tion is possible, allowing complex interactions between, for example, two OT sites
in different parts of the world.
Also, zero-trust is not an OT-exclusive solution. Plenty of IT scenarios might see
advantages in implementing zero-trust access. However, introducing, and especially
managing, one in an OT network requires additional knowledge because of how
the OT network is segregated behind several layers of firewalls. Thus it cannot be
adequately done without the right expertise. The fact that OT networks must be as
filtered and protected as much as possible from internet traffic creates a requirement
for additional care to avoid exposing sensible assets to remote attackers.
2.2 Problem definition
As the analysis above shows, it is clear that IT services, while providing solutions
somewhat similar to what OT environments require, do not fully answer the needs.
This is because it is not simply necessary to provide a service based on the
type of devices that the service is intended to protect. It is also crucial to consider
various factors such as overall goals, required expertise, and priorities. Talking about
priorities, another important aspect for OT that is drastically different from IT, is
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Figure 2.1: IT vs OT prioritization diagram
how cybersecurity prioritizes actions. A common concept in information security is
the CIA triad [22]. CIA is the abbreviation of the three aspects of information
that are important to protect: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. While all
these three aspects are essential to protect in IT security, priority is usually given to
the confidentiality of the information. That is because particular attention is posed
to keeping sensitive data secure from leaks and disclosures. In OT, however, the
prioritization goes oppositely, meaning that confidentiality is somewhat less critical,
while the highest effort made is to avoid availability issues because they could disrupt
automation or, worse, create physical danger for people and things (see figure 2.1)
[23].
With such profound differences between the two kinds of environments and how
important it is to protect the OT environment, it is impossible to rely only on ex-
isting services. Instead, dedicated services and processes must be created to address
OT needs, keeping the OT/ICS standards in cybersecurity in mind from the begin-
ning of the design phase until the completion of the implementation and testing.
3 Requirements
This chapter lists the main requirements for the various OT services gathered before
the design phase and explains the reasoning behind the definition of these require-
ments. The chapter is divided into sections, one for each development stream created
for the various OT services.
3.1 OT SOC
3.1.1 Understanding of OT network activity
The first requirement is that the OT SOC service that will be created must have a
profound understanding of OT network activity. As we saw in chapter 2, without
proper knowledge of the environment, the service will not be able to operate cor-
rectly. For this, it is necessary to have trained personnel in the SOC service that
has experience in OT to correctly monitor and operate on the network.
3.1.2 Close interaction between business sites and SOC
As Wärtsilä operates in multiple sites worldwide, it is impossible to implement a
fully functional central service without considering the involvement of personnel
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onsite. Their role in the environment consists of two primary responsibilities; they
are necessary for assisting SOC in its proactive detection activities but also in acting
directly in case any physical action is required onsite.
For monitoring activities, their value is very high. Even if the SOC detects
some anomalous activity that potentially can be a security incident, only the local
engineers can say if it is something unrecognized or part of legitimate activities
made on the site. This communication is also valuable for helping SOC tuning their
scanners to reduce the number of false positives in the long term. Finally, there are
certain operations that, due to their nature, cannot be done remotely by SOC. For
this, local engineers who operate in the OT environment must be ready to contacted
by SOC to perform certain activities under SOC guidance and supervision.
3.1.3 Proactive monitoring of the network to identify poten-
tial threats
As somewhat introduced above, SOC needs to proactively monitor the network to
intervene promptly if big “red flags” are raised. The damage of an incident can
be significantly reduced or even completely avoided if proper actions are taken in
time and, for this, being alerted before end-users start complaining about issues
is of extreme importance. Furthermore, even false positives in the detection may
highlight potential security gaps that malicious users may exploit.
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3.1.4 Being able to provide support based on business time
requirements
Different sites, and different zones in a site, may have different operational times.
For example, some production activities may run 24/7 while others are active only
during workdays. Regardless of the differences, SOC service should assist them
whenever needed and plan its activities based on the operational requirements of
the areas affected by them.
3.2 OT NOC
3.2.1 Operating as required by production times
Operating as required by production times is by far the most crucial requirement
identified for NOC operation. While most of the time the NOC is simply monitoring
the network, ensuring that everything is working correctly, sometimes issues in net-
work connectivity or other aspects (such as network device updates pending) may
require them to directly intervene on the network by remotely connecting to devices
and rebooting them or edit their configuration. These actions may cause abnormal
network connectivity, and they must be conducted prior accordance with local per-
sonnel. The approval of the local site, before any action is executed, is mandatory
because while a network outage in an IT environment may cause certain services
to become unavailable for some time, in an OT environment could cause physical
damage to people present if, for example, they are connecting devices with safety
systems. As was explained in section 2.2, availability is the most critical aspect in
the OT environment, and a switch reboot at the wrong moment could cause what
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all the service is designed to prevent.
3.2.2 Low response time
OT NOC should operate with very short response times, lower than the average
response time given for IT infrastructure. This because even 10 minutes of downtime
could cause important issues in the environment. In addition to this, being the NOC
centralized and the sites scattered around the globe, the service must be developed
to optimize the communication between the two entities to ensure that from the
detection of the problem to its solution, the overhead time is as low as possible.
In addition to this, NOC monitoring needs to be immediate in providing noti-
fication to interested parties in case it detects network issues and not delay raising
the alarm.
3.2.3 Being able to provide support based on business time
requirements
As in section 3.1 for SOC, also NOC needs to operate in a way that ensures network
availability to business based on their operational requirements.
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3.3 OT Asset Management
3.3.1 Asset discovery solution needs to be designed for the
OT network
Asset discovery is important because the large number of assets present in the OT
network makes it difficult to manually insert and keep updated information in the
asset database. For this, the discovery solution can be used, but it must be designed
to operate in the OT network [24].
As it was already explained in section 2.1.3, the solution needs to be a passive
scanner to avoid potential network congestion caused by the scanner pinging devices
and these replying [25]. Also, the device should understand the different protocols
that PLCs and other ICS systems use.
3.3.2 Integration of asset information with Incident manage-
ment and change management processes
Having an asset management system is helpful if this information can then be used
for something and not collected just for the sake of collecting them. For this, the final
solution must be able to integrate seamlessly with incident and change management
processes. These are processes that also involve SOC and NOC, as they are the
entities that most often open incidents and act to solve them. Having the possibility
of linking an incident to the affected asset increases the efficiency of these processes
as the information would be easier to obtain.
In the same way, also change management processes see the benefit of this inte-
gration. If we take as an example a change request opened for substituting a switch,
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the linkage of this request to the asset to be changed would first allow the people
approving and executing the change to clearly understand what the device affected
by the change is, but also it would allow an easier update of the asset database after
the change, as the record to update is clearly stated.
3.3.3 Possibility of storing documentation related to specific
assets
Even if asset attributes in most situations are sufficient to have a complete overview
of the asset itself, in some cases, especially for more complex systems, it is better to
have additional documentation in different forms to be attached to the asset itself.
For example, it is useful to see what the integrations involving one system or how
to reach a specific device remotely. All these various information should be stored
with the asset and need to be available only to specific people, following the least
privilege principle [26].
3.3.4 Implementation of processes for ensuring proper up-
date of asset information
As not all the information can be updated automatically by the asset discovery
tool, there is also the need to implement processes that allow asset information to
be updated in these other cases. For example, if an asset has its owner changed,
there is no way to detect this by analyzing network activity. Processes must then
be implemented to ensure this information is kept up-to-date. Business-related
information is as essential as technical information. If there is an issue, it is vital
that who is responsible for a device can be identified. Also, it is a must to understand
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in what area it operates and what its function is.
Understanding and tracking asset owners is also more complex than in the IT
environment because of the multiple parties involved in the ownership of the assets.
Having an asset management database of IT PCs makes it easy to keep the informa-
tion updated, as it is the IT office that assigns the devices to the end-users and takes
care of changing them once their lifecycle requires. In OT environments, different
parties are involved in buying new assets and handling them, making it difficult for
a centralized solution to keep accurate information.
3.4 OT PC Management Tools
3.4.1 Development of OT PC image created for suiting OT
PCs
As described in section 2.1.4, PCs used for different purposes need to be treated
differently. Operating systems can be tailored to suit end-user needs by configuring
them in different aspects. For example, their policy settings can be set as more or
less restrictive based on what the end-user is allowed to do, but also their update
schedules can be tuned to ensure that the updates are done regularly but not in a
way that makes the device unusable when needed.
Also, the software available in the device can be fine-tuned to the environment
the device is used in. In Microsoft Windows, for example, a common way this is
done is by configuring the SCCM (System Center Configuration Manager) [27]. The
SCCM allows a company to set up a software center where the end users can install
company-licensed software without requiring administrative rights. The SCCM has
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other functionalities, such as patch management and network protection, thus being
a powerful tool for managing many Windows devices.
3.4.2 Flexible lifecycle of devices to adapt to business needs
Production sites are very different from offices also in how devices are kept. Usually,
changing a device when it is used for general IT work is nothing complex. It requires
a backup of the work documents and general user data to remote storage (inside
company network or in the cloud), and the device can then be substituted with a new
one, where then the user can log on using his company credentials to find everything
he had ready to be downloaded. The software has to be reinstalled, but in general,
it is a quick operation. This process makes it very convenient for companies to lease
devices for their employees, meaning they are used for a predefined period, and at
its end, the device is returned to the lender. Leasing ensures that employees always
get modern machines to work with and, at the same time, protect the company
from the need of paying for computer issues outside of warranty; if a computer
gets malfunctioning because of hardware failure, the lender covers the expense by
providing a new device.
In the OT environment, this can become a bit more complex. First, usually, cloud
backups are not used due to security concerns. Of course, this can be addressed by
creating dedicated network storage that resides inside the company LAN. But the
biggest issue is the fact that the devices cannot always be substituted as easily be-
cause they are used in connection to specific hardware, meaning they have special
drivers and software installed that allow peripherals to communicate with the com-
puter. As these computers are then used for controlling these devices, often involved
in the operational processes, it cannot be expected that they are treated as normal
computers that can be easily swapped every 2 or 3 years when the lease contract
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requires it. Another approach is then needed, allowing machines to be used for a
predefined period, but with the possibility of extending their usage when required.
3.4.3 Centralized user directory with group admins to exe-
cute locally privileged actions
Most computers in the OT environment, differently than office ones, are shared by
multiple technicians. Having multiple employees working on a machine simultane-
ously means that using personal accounts, which are the way people log in to their
desktop in IT computers, is not always as convenient. If a user is logged on and
running a task on an engine connected to the computer, and someone else needs to
monitor the parameters, he will use the user account that is already logged on. This
scenario usually leads to shared local accounts (so not company managed) being
created on the machines and left unlocked to be easily accessible while working.
This situation is less than ideal, and while revamping the way OT PCs are handled,
it is also a requirement to solve this issue by finding a way to centrally manage the
OT PCs accounts and not make their usage too cumbersome for OT engineers.
3.5 OT Remote Connectivity
3.5.1 Be able to solve screen sharing and zero trust access
needs
As described in section 2.1.5, the need is to find one or multiple solutions to solve
both screen sharing and zero trust access needs. Screen sharing can be used for
multiple purposes, from letting a technician monitor a process simply connecting
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to the computer that controls it to offering technical assistance remotely in case
of issues. Zero trust access is way more versatile. It allows integration between
systems treating internal and external traffic in the same way. It always requires
authentication to allow a connection, no matter if the source is the internal LAN
or the cloud. This solution allows great flexibility because it lets an internal device
operate with a cloud one without requiring complex configuration to implement it
securely; once the zero trust appliance is deployed in the network and configured, it
will be easily adaptable to all required use cases.
3.5.2 Necessity to solve both internal and externals needs
The solutions that will be used need to solve all the needs related to remote con-
nectivity, including managing both external and internal users. It can be expected
that remote connectivity sessions would not only be used by Wärtsilä employees.
Some sessions, especially screen sharing ones, would see the involvement of external
users such as device manufacturers for technical assistance and Wärtsilä partners
and suppliers. For this, the solutions identified need to allow easy user provision-
ing both for Wärtsilä employees and externals while also allowing great user rights
management to avoid allowing external users to perform unwanted actions.
3.5.3 Complete logging of sessions
Logging users’ and systems’ actions is one of the most common best practices in cy-
bersecurity [28]. Logging allows accountability for actions taken, but it also proves
very useful in troubleshooting issues for identifying the root cause. Remote connec-
tivity solutions, since it involves remote users executing actions on local machines,
require verbose and complete logging of actions done during the remote session [29].
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Screen sharing sessions should be able to log both screen recording and any action
or command executed by the guest in the host computer.
3.5.4 Be convenient to implement correctly in a fully segre-
gated network without requiring workarounds that may
affect the security
Ideal solutions should be deployed in complex networks such as those in OT sites,
meaning that then should work in a heavily segmented network. The solutions
should not need complex network changes or, worse, workarounds that may affect
the network’s security. They should natively support implementation in all kinds of
networks and, once deployed, function without excessively complex firewall config-
urations that make it more difficult to manage the security of the LAN.
4 Design
After defining the requirements, the first phase of the project began, meaning the
design of the various solutions. The design of the solutions was made before their
implementation. Because of that, it has not foreseen various problems that arose
in the later phases that required the design to be adapted to solve them. In this
chapter, it is not described the final solution, rather how the initial requirements
shaped into the first idea of a solution that could start being implemented.
4.1 OT SOC
For starting designing the Wärtsilä OT SOC, the first step was understanding how
things were handled in the general IT environment. Wärtsilä already has a SOC
internally that is responsible for responding to security incidents. As Wärtsilä SOC
was already in charge of security incidents management, it had great expertise in
incident management inside Wärtsilä, as well as excellent knowledge of the company,
something that no external service would be able to provide. However, it lacked
OT-specific tools and would not efficiently monitor the OT network for anomalies
without additional resources.
For this, it was planned to acquire an external supplier (from here on called
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supplier A) that took care of network monitoring and collaborate with Wärtsilä
SOC. This supplier already had other responsibilities in managing the Wärtsilä
network and seemed a perfect candidate also for this new role, as they were able
to provide also OT oriented resources to assist Wärtsilä during the deployment
of the service as well as to conduct it during the operational mode. One of its
responsibilities was to provide 24/7 monitoring of the OT network, they provided
the monitoring solution to be installed in the various sites and took care of its
management.
The monitoring solution it was agreed to use was great for Wärtsilä needs because
of multiple factors:
• It is designed to monitor OT-specific network traffic, supporting a large num-
ber of OT related protocols
• It provides passive scanning of the network
• It offers asset discovery capabilities, proving useful also for being used as part
of asset management solution
Supplier A not only forwards alerts coming from the monitoring solution to
Wärtsilä SOC. It also has to process any alert directly, providing a parallel SOC
service, also active 24/7 to respond to potential incidents. Depending on where
the alert was coming from (monitoring or incident report), both Wärtsilä SOC or
the supplier could open an incident ticket that is then processed by both parties in
collaboration.
Incident analysis often requires information gathering from all informed parties.
This often includes people working in OT sites, meaning OT engineers, that operate
the devices in the network monitored. For this, it was planned that, during the
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information gathering phase, Wärtsilä SOC gets in contact directly with OT engi-
neers through the Wärtsilä ticketing system, allowing them to reply to SOC inquires
to assist them in determining what false positives are and what incidents are to be
further investigated.
This information can be used by supplier A to tune the monitoring solution to
reduce the number of false positives in the future. The monitoring process, and all
the incident management process is subject to a constant improvement based on the
study on closed incidents.
4.2 OT NOC
Thanks to their experience with the OT network, it was planned to use supplier A
also for ensuring that the network is kept operational through a NOC service.
Unlike for OT SOC, it was not planned to have an internal one as it was not
deemed necessary and would only increase overhead times. As in SOC, monitoring
is also a big part of the NOC service. NOC has direct access to the network device
management to be able to check their status as well as intervening in case of issues.
In case an incident is detected, NOC has to notify Wärtsilä and act to re-establish
connectivity. Incidents can also be opened by Wärtsilä by getting in contact with
the NOC service directly. In any case, NOC takes the lead in acting to solve the issue
at the agreed time. At the same time, it keeps in contact with Wärtsilä, addressing
directly local OT engineers in case any information or physical action is required to
solve the issue. The Internal OT security team may also be consulted in case an
additional opinion is needed.
In case a permanent change in the network is required, Wärtsilä still has to
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approve the change through an approval chain that involves in the first place the
internal OT security team, but also other network teams inside Wärtsilä as the
change could also affect devices outside the OT network. A change request in the
OT network can be opened by NOC in case the change is needed to solve an incident
but can also be requested by OT engineers in the site if they need any change in the
OT network. No matter what is the source of the request, it still has to be approved
by the OT security team if it involves changes in security configuration or any setting
that can affect the overall security of the network. OT NOC would execute any
change required after obtaining the required approval. Wärtsilä internals, primarily
OT engineers, need then to check that the change is working as expected and not
causing any issue in the environment. After the change has been concluded, the
internal security team takes care of documenting it. This activity includes updating
the asset management solution better described in section 4.3.
NOC, finally, also takes care of operational tasks related to network devices,
such as ensuring their software is updated to the latest version. Any activity that
affects network operativity (e.g., device upgrade) needs to be agreed upon by NOC
and the OT site following the same communication channel used for incidents (see
section 5.2 for details regarding the implementation). As explained in section 3.2,
the agreement between NOC and local business is critical before any action on the
network is executed to avoid that network downtime could cause production issues
or, worse, physical incidents.
4.3 OT Asset Management
The asset management solution was designed keeping in mind that its primary
purpose is to support various services in the OT environment and to help the various
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teams involved in having a clear understanding of the environment.
For storing the information about the various assets, it was planned to use the
same platform that was used for all incident management processes, which is Ser-
viceNow. ServiceNow supports natively the creation of a CMDB (Configuration
Management DataBase) [30], that proves perfect for this purpose. Note that a
CMDB is not an asset management solution by itself, but it is a good starting point
to create one for various reason:
• It allows the creation of a database of devices that can be accessed easily
• The data model is flexible, meaning it can be adapted to the needs of OT
environment assets cataloging
• Every asset is linked to a CI (Configuration Item) that can then be used as a
reference to the CI in any ticket (both incident ticket and change management
ticket)
• ServiceNow is a well-recognized solution for managing company workflow in
various areas, and using this solution will allow future integration between
other systems still not in the scope
• ServiceNow also allows handling company knowledge base, making it easy
to create additional documentation for a specific asset and then liking them
together
The OT asset data model was designed to store all the information deemed
necessary for having a good understanding of any OT asset, this includes:
• Asset name, or how is identified in the company
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• Device type, such as PC, Switch, SCADA, PLC, sensor, etc.
• Business information, such as asset owner, location, and department
• Software information, such as firmware, operative system, CPE [31]
• Hardware info, such as device manufacturer and model
• Criticality, to highlight how important that specific asset is for site operations
Also, the CMDB was divided into three major categories: OT Servers, OT Net-
work devices, and OT other devices to make the CMDB easier to browse.
A CMDB, however, is just a database used for storing information about assets,
and alone it cannot be considered a valid solution because it lacks all the processes
that are required for keeping it updated and accurate. The first way the CMDB is
kept updated is through the asset discovery solution, also used by OT SOC. The
solution needs to automatically send data to ServiceNow CMDB and update the
asset information automatically without requiring user interaction. This is helpful
also for filling up the CMDB the first time, as manually inserting thousands of
devices into the database manually would have required too much effort. However,
automatic updates should not happen in some instances, primarily when an update
would edit an attribute that is not supposed to change autonomously. For example,
a device is not expected to change its IP address automatically, and if that would
happen the automatic update should not execute, and a notification is sent to the
OT security team for manual check and eventual update.
Of course, there are plenty of cases where a manual update of the CMDB needs
to be done instead, primarily when an asset gets retired or has some settings changed
due to a change process. In the case of retirement, it is the asset owner itself that
needs to report it to the correct office for them to update the CMDB, while in case
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of change, it is defined in the change process itself who is responsible for updating
the documentation (including CMDB). For example, in the case of network devices,
the OT security team must document the change after NOC has executed it.
4.4 OT PC Management Tools
OT PC management tools stream applied various changes in how OT PCs were
handled. Probably the biggest one of these was the creation of the OT PC image.
This is a version of Microsoft Windows 10 that has different settings than the one
that is normally installed in Wärtsilä company devices.
The first change is the more restrictive hardening settings that are applied com-
pared to standard computers. For example, certain internet-related services are
disabled on these machines to reduce the number of external connections of these
devices. The policies are not only more restrictive but also more adapted to the spe-
cific device situation, as a general policy could not address all OT use cases due to
how different the activities are from one area to the other. Another change is what
software is installed natively on these devices. As these machines are not supposed
to access the cloud, several internet applications such OneDrive or Office 365 are
not available on these devices, being replaced by offline versions where required. Of
course, some online connectivity is kept for authorized integration and for keeping
the devices updated to the latest OS version.
Also, these devices need have a completely separate Active Directory domain, so
the accounts and the policies are handled separately from the IT environment. OT
computer accounts can then have, for example, different maximum password age
or complexity requirements to better adapt to the security level that was planned
to be achieved but at the same time not overcomplicating things for OT engineers.
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Moreover, a new SCCM had to be developed to handle software installation and
device patching, so company software needs to be approved for OT usage separately.
Furthermore, the OT computer lifecycle has been designed differently than reg-
ular PCs. OT computers will be purchased from the same supplier that leases our
devices. This will allow the devices to be kept in operation as much as needed, even
if it was designed for a nominal life of 5 years. In case it is needed, the lifecycle can
be extended. For example, if a computer is connected to a system that is replaced
in 2 years, the computer renewal can wait for that moment.
4.5 OT Remote Connectivity
It was planned to have two different sub-streams for OT remote connectivity. One
stream researched for a solution regarding a valid screen sharing application, and
another looked into finding one that solved the need for zero-trust access. As these
solutions are relatively complex to be developed internally, it was opted to look in
the market and find the most appropriate solutions that would have been suitable
for our needs while having a pricing model that would be convenient for our use
case.
While the two solutions are different, they still both require to be used in the
OT environment and, for this, it was set as a vital requirement the possibility of
integrating these with the OT Active Directory, so OT user accounts can be granted
various rights related to remote access, without needing additional accounts. Also,
the solution should support accounts coming from different organizations natively;
in short, being able to implement federated access.
Both solutions need to have a very granular permission control. For example,
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certain users may be allowed to connect only to some machines at certain hours
remotely; and others may connect to other devices but only after approval by a
responsible group. This is important as it would be risky to allow unauthorized
users to connect to factory machines. Also, the actions that can be taken by a guest
should be defined by the role of the user. For example, in a screen sharing session,
certain users may not be allowed to transfer files from and to the host or may not
be allowed to access peripherals or execute commands directly.
Finally, as defined better in the requirements solution will have strong logging
capabilities to ensure that no action can be performed remotely without knowing.
This has a double use: first, it makes people accountable for their actions, even when
remotely controlling another user, but also this logging can be used as a “black box”
to diagnose any issue that may arise after a remote session. The ideal solutions
support different kinds of logging:
• Logging of sessions and connections
• Logging of failed authentication attempts
• Screen sharing session recording
• Remote commands logging
• Chat host-guest logging
• Logging of particular actions done by the guest (e.g., blocking host mouse/key-
board, send files from/to host machine, taking screenshots)
5 Implementation
This chapter will describe how the services were implemented, starting from the
design drafted in chapter 4. It will be described more in detail how integrations
between service components were handled. These streams were developed simul-
taneously except for OT remote connectivity where, due to various reasons, the
development started some months later. However, since this stream is more inde-
pendent from the others, timing has not caused issues. Differently, the other streams
needed parallel development as they rely on each other. For example, SOC service
would be less effective without proper integration with OT asset management.
5.1 OT SOC
The implementation of SOC service included two main parts. The installation of
the OT network monitoring solution and the implementation of the processes in
ServiceNow. Of course, also on the supplier side, some development was needed
to put their SOC up and running. The development of this part was done outside
Wärtsilä, and it is not part of the scope of this thesis.
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5.1.1 Implementation of the monitoring solution
For the monitoring solution to work, it needed to have complete visibility of the
network. As this solution cannot scan the network by itself being passive, the
network needed to be adapted to route copies of the traffic to the solution for it to
record and analyze it. This adaptation is easily doable by modern network devices
thanks to traffic mirroring, allowing network packages to be duplicated and sent to
multiple destinations, such as the intended receiver and the monitoring solution.
The monitoring system then sends the data directly to the Supplier SOC through
the cloud so that they could access the data collected, and alerts can be raised to
Wärtsilä in case issues are detected.
The most challenging part in this part of the implementation certainly is to
configure the network in a way that all the traffic is received by the appliance, and,
as a second challenge, to implement authentication correctly so that highly sensitive
data such as that stored in the IDS are not accessible by unauthorized people.
5.1.2 Implementation of the SOC processes
This second part was certainly more complex to implement than the one above.
Incident management handling of a completely new service in ServiceNow requires
multiple actions to be done.
First, the integration between the supplier and Wärtsilä systems needed to be
implemented to enable the supplier to start the incident management process with-
out additional manual activities. This development was a relatively quick process
as the integration between the supplier and ServiceNow was already existing be-
cause of other IT services they were already providing to us. Thus it only required
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a reconfiguration to open the ticket with the correct categorization and for the
ticket to be assigned to the right support group (Wärtsilä SOC). The integration is
practically done through simple RESTful APIs. For this kind of application, they
provide simple implementation while still achieving good security through proper
authentication.
Once this part was done, it was a matter of involving the right people in the
process and enabling them to process the incident through the platform. For this,
support groups were created in ServiceNow. Support groups are simply groups of one
or more people that can have some tickets assigned to them, and they are responsible
for processing the ticket in question. As Wärtsilä SOC, because was already existing
in solving IT incidents, did not need a group for them, the groups that had to be
created were the ones of the internal OT team and the ones of local OT engineers
working in the sites. The internal OT team comprises the people working in Wärtsilä
as cybersecurity specialists for the OT infrastructure and was needed mainly when a
particular incident would require their consultancy for addressing the issue. For the
local OT engineers, instead, for each Wärtsilä site, a single group is created. When
Wärtsilä SOC analyzes an incident and needs information from the site, it would not
be manageable if that ticket goes one single group counting multiple sites. It would
cause two main issues: first, the ticket would most probably be left unanswered as
it would be problematic to understand for local OT engineers to understand if the
ticket is related to their site; secondly, it would cause a severe confidentiality issue,
as information of a specific site network activity cannot be shared with other sites.
Finally, how incident tickets were decided to be handled was this: for each in-
cident detected or reported, an incident ticket is created. Every incident then has
multiple sub-tickets, called incident tasks, that can be created and assigned to var-
ious support groups. This method allowed SOC to centralize incident management
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but allowing the delegation of a specific task to some groups without losing own-
ership of the incident in question. This results in multiple tasks being opened and
closed for each incident and allows better logging of the actions conducted to process
each incident. Once all the tasks are closed, the SOC can close the main incident,
officially marking it as solved (or, in some cases, unsolved).
5.2 OT NOC
OT NOC service is somewhat simpler than SOC in terms of incident handling as it
does not involve such complex incidents, and the lead in processing incidents and
solving them is done by the supplier.
Allowing supplier A to monitor our network devices was a matter of setting up
a way to securely access Wärtsilä internal OT network, for example, with a VPN
tunnel. The complexity in implementing the NOC processes, similarly to SOC, is
to correctly enable various parties to process both incident and change management
efficiently.
This service was developed by improving the implementation multiple times
because, due to company needs, it was needed to start piloting the service even
before the optimal implementation was achieved. The first way the process was
implemented was to use direct email communication between the NOC and vari-
ous Wärtsilä groups. Whenever an incident is detected, NOC contacts internal OT
support and local OT engineers, thanks to a contact list shared with them. This
list included the name of the contact, email, telephone number (for high priority
incidents), and area of competence. These are enough details for NOC to address
the right people in case information or actions are needed. This simple email com-
munication is enough for handling simple incidents as tracking the ticket is done on
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the supplier’s internal system by using the email conversation as ticket notes. This
has some limitations, however. First, it can become hard to keep track of the opened
incidents through email conversations alone, and while the tickets are tracked and
stored in the supplier platform, there is no long-term storage of tickets inside the
company, and that may be needed for future analysis and general logging purposes.
While this first process went into testing during the piloting phase (see chapter
7), the development of the improved version immediately started. The new process
utilizes ServiceNow to keep track of open tickets on the Wärtsilä side. If an internal
employee notices a network issue in the OT environment, it has to contact the
company service desk instead of contacting NOC directly. The service desk would
then open a ticket in ServiceNow and send an email to NOC linking the entire email
conversation to the ticket. In this way, all the exchange between NOC and Wärtsilä
support groups happens through ServiceNow and will be automatically registered in
the ticket. If it is NOC to detect an issue, they will contact the Wärtsilä service desk
themselves, obtaining the same result. In this way, both Wärtsilä and NOC always
have any incident ticket registered in their respective systems. The disadvantage
of this methodology is that the standard process became a bit more complex, with
NOC having to get in contact with local OT engineers through ServiceNow, but
this can always be avoided in an emergency; in that case, NOC could get in contact
directly through the phone and any action planned is be registered in the ticket
thanks to the email integration afterward.
This new system is better for handling change management because, in this way,
only tickets approved by the internal OT team are sent to NOC by ServiceNow for
them to execute the change. With direct email exchange, it was possible for locals to
ask for actions directly to the NOC and, if these were executed without internal OT
team approval, there would a potential risk of security issues if no security specialist
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would properly analyze and approve the change.
5.3 OT Asset Management
The OT Asset Management development was required mainly to prepare the Ser-
viceNow CMDB for storing OT asset data, setting up the integration to get the
data from the monitoring platform to the CMDB, and implementing the processes
to have the manual updates regularly executed.
5.3.1 Implementation of the CMDB
Implementing the CMDB was not starting from scratch as ServiceNow natively
supports CMDBs, and it mainly required configuring the CMDB instance to be
compliant with the asset model created in the design phase.
However, the initial asset data model did not consider some attributes included
during implementation time. For example, when OT PC management tools stream
implementation and, in particular, the OT PC order process proceeded, it was un-
derstood that it was necessary to add some attributes to store OT PC-specific in-
formation such as device delivery date and warranty expiration. Thanks to the
flexibility of the platform, these changes could be implemented in a very short time.
It was implemented the possibility of assigning each asset to incidents and problems,
as it was one of the requirements set in the beginning.
In general, the implementation of this was completed without significant issues.
Some minor bugs were quickly fixed after an accurate User Acceptance Testing
(UAT) phase, where all the essential features were tested to ensure nothing was
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missing and assets could be created and processed correctly.
5.3.2 Implementation of the integration
However, integration between the monitoring solution and ServiceNow CMDB was
trickier and required more time and effort to complete. The integration consisted of
a ServiceNow application developed for Wärtsilä by the manufacturer of the security
monitoring solution. The application works by using the monitoring solution APIs
to authenticate and fetch a list of assets and their attributes from the solution and
match these to the ServiceNow CMDB table. IP and MAC addresses are used as
unique identifiers for the assets to match the data and update the correct fields in
the CMDB. The solution is scheduled to run every 12 hours, deemed acceptable as
the maximum delay time for updates.
The significant issues that were encountered in this phase were various. The
first version of the application developed by the manufacturer could not update
asset information but only able to create new assets. That was not ideal because
it would have served well the purpose of populating the CMDB with all the OT
equipment, but it would not be able to keep the database updated, which is one
of the main requirements set at the beginning of the project. After clarifying the
issue, it was possible to start developing this feature, but this raised another issue.
ServiceNow applications require a lengthy verification process before being available
to install on the platform, and this applies to updates too. This problem increased
the development time by weeks and required to postpone the testing of the asset
management solution. Luckily SOC and NOC processes and PC management tool
stream were able to move into testing sooner, operating without the support of the
assets data.
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5.3.3 Implementation of the processes
Processes were reasonably easy to implement as manually updating device informa-
tion was something most teams were already doing for the IT CMDB. Mainly the
most important part was to define who was responsible for each asset group. For
servers, it was decided that the same team handling IT servers was going to be the
one responsible for managing also OT ones, meaning their responsibility was also
to ensure that any change was correctly reported in the CMDB after the execution.
For OT PCs, these changes are handled by the PC supplier’s local support, while for
network devices, it is NOC’s responsibility. However, as NOC cannot access Wärt-
silä CMDB, it is the responsibility of the OT team to update the CMDB record
for the affected asset. Updates on the CMDB are planned to be executed after the
closure of the change during the documentation update step.
5.4 OT PC management tools
OT PC management tools implementation required multiple activities. One was
developing the OT PC order process, making OT PC available in the company tools
catalog, and ensuring that when a user orders one, all the necessary information
is being passed to the proper parties and recorded in the OT CMDB. Another
critical step was to deploy the systems necessary to make OT PC images run (Active
Directory and SCCM) and, finally, migrate the already existing OT PCs to the new
environment.
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5.4.1 OT PC order process implementation
To allow OT engineers to buy OT computers, it was needed to create a process that
allows them to make a simple tool order, as for other IT devices, and handle all
the phases of the order from the buy phase up to the moment the PC is ready for
pickup at the location selected by the purchaser.
The first step was to create a product entry for the selected models in the com-
pany IT catalog. The order form was also modified to add a new checkbox where the
user can specify that the computer would be used in the OT environment. When
this option is selected, the computer is reported as OT in the order, and the sup-
plier, knowing that, would not pre-install the ‘standard’ operative system, delivering
directly to the factory specified by the person that made the order. When the or-
der is confirmed, and when the device is shipped, the purchaser is notified through
email and, during these steps, various information about the computer is gathered
and used to create a record in the OT CMDB. Once the device has arrived in the
factory, the local support of the supplier takes care of installing the OT PC image in
the device. After the installation is performed by the local support, the purchaser is
notified that the computer is available for pickup, and the OT engineer would have
a machine ready for use.
Particular issues found during this implementation were how to get enough data
to create the asset record during the order process. This because MAC address was
a critical attribute necessary to get at order time; otherwise, the discovery solution
would not be able to recognize the record created during the order and would create
a duplicate entry when the device would appear on the network. To cope with this
issue, it was agreed with the device distributor that the confirmation of dispatch of
the device has to include also the MAC address of the machine. In this way, the
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attribute is available to be used as a unique key to identify the PC asset record.
5.4.2 Preparation of the environment and migration of exist-
ing computers
Migration of the IT PCs present in the OT network to the new OT PC image was
undoubtedly the most challenging part of the stream, requiring multiple changes in
the approach before being conducted successfully.
Initially, the thought was to divide the existing computers into batches and
upgrade them by reinstalling the new image. This soon was proven impossible for
multiple reasons. First, there were not enough spare machines to allow this without
disrupting operations in the factory. Most of these computers are needed every day,
and even a stop of 2-3 days on multiple machines would affect site operations. As
a second issue, reinstalling machines without testing that the business application
would work with the new policies and hardening rules creates the risk that machines
would stay unavailable for weeks before the issues are fixed.
For this, it was planned a more careful approach. Instead of requiring the ma-
chines to be formatted and reinstalled, the changes brought by the OT PC image
were manually implemented, but in 3 phases instead of a single one, starting with
only 2-3 machines for each area. The migration proceeded as follows. First, the
pilot machines were identified, and Office 365 was substituted with Office 2019 to
allow these to run without connection to Microsoft servers. The same was done for
the antivirus, to connect it to the OT controller instead of the IT one. Then, the
new hardening settings were applied, and the various business application could be
tested with the new settings. As soon as all the applications were tested and working
successfully, the rest of the computers could be divided into batches and hardened
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safely. Only then were the PCs finally moved to the new OT Active Directory, and
the new OT SCCM substituted the IT one.
5.5 OT remote connectivity
After testing multiple solutions, it was opted to go with one that was able to address
both the screen sharing and the zero-trust access needs. The solution required one
master node to be deployed and to be reachable by all the sites. For this, it was
decided to opt for renting an IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service) machine on the cloud
and installing the virtual appliance provided by the solution there. An alternative
would have been to install a physical solution on our environment and configure the
firewalls to allow other sites to be able to connect, but it was decided that having
the central node in the cloud is more convenient to deploy and maintain without
having additional risks as the traffic has to travel through the internet in any case.
All the remote connections are started by contacting this appliance, and this
one, after checking that the connection is authorized, initiates a connection to the
target host. In every site, a jump host is placed in the OT DMZ. This allows to
create a single rule in the firewall, the one that allows the connection between the
cloud appliance and the jump host, instead of allowing all the clients to be reachable
remotely by the appliance. Then the jump host relays the connection to the client.
Authorization of connections is implemented by defining multiple user groups.
To each group, plenty of privileges can be defined, from what type of connection
they are allowed to open to precise settings such as what folders in each machine
are allowed to access. Then groups of approvers are created. These users receive an
email notification whenever someone is trying to open a connection, and they can
allow or deny it. This is very useful, especially for externals such as vendors, to have
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complete control over their connection to internal systems.
This system will be used whenever needed, also to allow connections between IT
and OT devices. In this way, it is possible to have a single firewall rule instead of
opening multiple paths that can be exploited by an attacker. With this approach, the
IT network is treated in the same way as the cloud, requiring a strong authentication
in any case (following the principles of zero trust).
It was decided to use LDAP as the protocol for handling user accounts as it was
the most adapt to our use case, as all the users in the OT environment would have
a personal account in the OT Active Directory. Externals have accounts in this AD
too, of course, their privileges are limited based on their needs.
Finally, the solution fully supports all the kinds of logging expected to have,
down to the forensic analysis of each connection, tracking every action done, and
allowing for easy search. It is also possible from the log to go precisely to the point
any action was done in the video recording. This functionality can be helpful to
observe why, for example, a command was typed in the console.
5.5.1 Implementation of the processes
Parallel to the technical implementation of the solution, the implementation of the
various processes for enrolling users and machines to the platform was defined.
In order to ensure that local users are easily able to be enrolled in the platform,
it was agreed that the OT support team needs to authorize only privileged accounts
and accounts that require abnormal permissions (for example, a user in Spain re-
quiring unattended access to machinery in Finland). For standard requests, local
supervisors can authorize the request to reduce processing time.
6 Use Cases
After the services were implemented, various use cases to perform testing without
forgetting important aspects were defined. This step is essential as testing could not
be adequately done without a clear understanding of the various ways the system
was expected to be used.
6.1 OT SOC
For security incidents, every user needs to be able to report a security incident, and
that needs to be received by SOC. At the same time also alerts from monitoring needs
to be escalated to incidents whenever the supplier A SOC deems it necessary. The
incident process needs to progress without problems, and, more importantly, SOC
needs to be able to contact the other support teams (primarily OT local support),
and the incident tasks need to be processed and closed correctly.
6.2 OT NOC
In the case of NOC, OT engineers have to be able to report network problems quickly,
and NOC has to be able to start working for a solution quickly. At the same time,
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NOC monitoring should prove capable of quickly detecting any disruption without
relying on user reporting to start acting. Also, the process should proceed smoothly
in this service, and communication between Wärtsilä and NOC should not be slowed
by unnecessary delays.
Furthermore, OT engineers should also be able to request changes to be done
on the network, such as assigning a switch port to a specific VLAN or allowing
integration between two systems. However, the OT team needs to be always able
to verify the change before the execution made by NOC.
6.3 OT Asset Management
The OT asset management system also has to be tested thoroughly. In particular,
it must be tested that all kinds of OT assets can be correctly assigned to tickets
by any party taking part in incident and change management processes. Then OT
support team also needs to be able to edit manually any attribute in the assets, even
the ones created automatically by the monitoring solution.
OT support, Wärtsilä SOC, and OT local support should be able to use the
search functionality to quickly get information about assets from basic information
such as IP address or device name. Moreover, any documentation related to the
asset should be easily reachable. Incidents related to the asset should be available
on the asset page. This also includes past incidents to monitor assets that have an
anomalously high number of incidents. Finally, changes should always include asset
database update as part of their process.
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6.4 OT PC Management Tools
For OT PCs to successfully pass the testing phase, users should not report signif-
icant issues using their machines. The devices should be fully able to perform the
activities they are appointed for, but at the same time, the hardening should block
any potentially risky operation. The responsible of the various OT areas should be
able to use privileged accounts to perform maintenance actions without additional
assistance, but these actions must be logged appropriately.
Also, the PCs that have been migrated and are not newly ordered should operate
in the same way as brand new OT machines, without exceptions.
6.5 OT Remote Connectivity
Defining a complete list of use cases for remote connectivity to test is problematic
because, thanks to the nature of the solution implemented, the ways it can be
operated are various.
For sure, one of the first needs is remote screen sharing, allowing users to remotely
connect to their machines in the OT environment and enable them to operate from
anywhere in the world. Also, for the cybersecurity team, logging these sessions
should be easy to analyze to detect anomalous actions.
A complete list of different types of connections to be tested would not be possible
to be done here, but the testing can be considered successful if all the possible kinds
of remote connections can be set up securely. Primary examples are the connectivity
to PLCs and other ICS equipment and integrations between multiple OT sites.
7 Testing
Testing of the solution was done starting from one single site to limit any issue that
could arise to that site only. The plan was to pilot the changes in the first site and
learn what can be improved so that the rollout in the other site would progressively
be optimized. In this section, it is highlighted for each stream what were the major
issues found in the testing and how it was planned to address them as well.
7.1 OT SOC
OT SOC service did not immediately proceed with full operational mode since the
start. As the monitoring solution required some time to learn what regular network
traffic is on the site. Initially, a high number of false positives was expected. It was
opted not to report any incident and have a weekly meeting to analyze the main
alerts coming from monitoring. In this meeting, supplier A’s SOC shows the alerts
raised, and the OT engineers in Trieste, based on the IPs and the date and time of
the alarm, try to understand if that was an actual alert or a false alarm. As expected
in the first weeks, several of them were normal and legitimate operations, and with
this collaboration, the monitoring could be tuned for reducing these warnings. This
phase of the testing went well as the people in the local site were aware of what was
happening in the network, even recognizing devices just by knowing the IP or even
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the Mac address. An asset management system provides a great help in this step as
it can keep all this information, but it was not available since the beginning of the
SOC stream.
When the monitoring solution was deemed sufficiently accurate, the normal SOC
processes started as described in the previous chapters. As Wärtsilä SOC was al-
ready used to these processes, the most significant effort to be made was more on
the local site engineers’ side. They needed to be trained for the new way of han-
dling security incidents. All OT engineers were entirely new to incident management
processes, which was the biggest challenge to solve during the testing phase. How-
ever, the usage of a platform like ServiceNow simplified the workflow. It helped
OT engineers to learn the process faster and, thanks to multiple training sessions,
the engineers understood their duties in processing incident tasks, and the process
started to work as expected, even with some minor delays due to the response time
of the OT local support group. This delay has been deemed not a big issue as high
priority incidents would be appropriately marked to achieve a faster response time.
7.2 OT NOC
As described in section 5.2, the testing of the NOC services started before the
ServiceNow platform was ready to handle incidents. For this, the first incident was
addressed using standard emails between NOC and Wärtsilä.
NOC monitoring proved to be very reactive in communicating network issues
to the OT support team, and most of the incidents were easily solved in a short
amount of time. Also, the requests from the local site were properly reaching NOC
and were addressed as expected. One crucial issue emerged. When OT local site
engineers were requesting NOC changes, they sometimes ignored involving the OT
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support in evaluating and approving the change in question. This lack of OT support
moderation was a problem not tolerable in operational mode, and for this specific
reason, the involvement of ServiceNow change management has proven to be helpful.
After implementing a proper ticketing system, the tickets were easier to process,
still maintaining the necessary speed thanks to the possibility of using telephone
calls whenever an action was considered urgent. Collaboration between the local
site and NOC met the expectations, and for this, the solution was accepted as valid.
7.3 OT Asset Management
As explained in section 5.3, asset management service faced issues during implemen-
tation, primarily integrating the asset discovery solution and the OT CMDB. For
this, the piloting of the asset management started without any automatic feed from
the monitoring solution but simply by manually adding the most important assets
such as network switches and OT PCs to the CMDB. In this way, these assets could
be tracked in other processes such as change requests in the network or security
incidents.
Even with this limitation, the CMDB proved helpful in supporting the other ser-
vices and tested successfully providing valuable insights during incident and change
management processes.
When the implementation of integration was completed, the service became even
more effective, storing even more devices that were not possible due to the large
number to be manually added. This capability decreased the time and effort required
for solving incidents as, for example, SOC could check information related to site
assets without requiring local engineers’ consultancy.
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7.4 OT PC Management Tools
OT PC ordering process was tested successfully, and the devices were delivered as
expected from the supplier. The OT PC image was proven capable of responding
to the needs of the OT site.
Migration activities proceeded even with some issues. One issue faced in the
migration was how to handle existing devices that were of the most various models
and system versions. While the new models were limited to 4-5 different types, the
old PCs to be migrated were various. Some of them were not even upgraded to
Windows 10, and this caused issues with the Office 2019 installation as having the
latest version of Windows was a minimum requirement for the installation. However,
the migration proceeded with the rest of the devices, and the business applications
were tested successfully by the OT local engineers.
The more complex machines needed manual hardening, and the oldest ones,
which were too difficult to be migrated and kept supported, were substituted with
new OT machines ordered using the new order process already successfully tested.
This caused some additional costs for local sites as they had to substitute mul-
tiple devices, but they believed that keeping old devices in an active production
environment would not be sustainable in the long term.
7.5 OT Remote Connectivity
OT Remote Connectivity solution testing was the latest to be started and, while
still ongoing, it is showing very promising results. The testing was conducted in
the same ways as for the other services: piloting sites were utilized to check how
the solution worked and gather feedback. The users of the designated sites stopped
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using the locally-managed remote connectivity solution and got enrolled in the new
solution.
The practical use of screen sharing and remote access solutions was already
known for local engineers so learning a new solution was not problematic. They,
however, had to learn how to request adding new machines to remote access properly.
As these requested must be approved by a supervisor, it was not possible anymore
for local businesses to install a remote access client on the target machine as any
unauthorized connection would be blocked by the firewall. Instead, they had to
manually raise a change request for a machine to be added as a possible host device
and, after the request was approved, the requested machine would be reachable
remotely by that user. This ensured a better analysis of business reasons behind
every request and easier traceability of every remote connection allowed in Wärtsilä.
8 Conclusions
While a first attempt in trying to resolve the problems caused by the particular
needs of the OT environment, these services made a significant difference for both
the overall security maturity of the sites and the people who worked in them.
Implementing services specifically targeted to the production environment and
appointing dedicated people to run them ensured that the right priorities were always
taken into account by all the parties involved. The close integration of local OT
engineers in the various processes was one of the most positive changes relative to the
past as they demonstrated to be an excellent source of information for understanding
what is happening in each area of the site. It also let them express their needs
without the need for intermediaries that would have increased the process complexity
while losing contact with the real needs of the business.
Including local businesses in the centralized cybersecurity processes required a
special effort to train them in executing these new roles they had to cover, but the
positive note is that they recognized why they were needed and put high effort into
making the project successful.
These services will need further improvement over time, but they are a good
starting point, and they already showed promising results during the piloting phase.
What is sure, however, is that OT security would become a more and more important
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aspect for companies that have to rely on production sites to conduct their business.
Addressing these sorts of needs now would put the companies that decide to do so in
the lead in terms of security and would potentially save millions of euros in avoiding
expensive security incidents.
It is possible that in the future new approaches for the OT environment will rise,
and these services will not prove sufficient for all the needs that we have identified at
the beginning of the project. We plan to have a continuous improvement approach
where we are constantly considering what can be done to offer better security to
production environments without disrupting business activities over-complicating
their work.
8.1 Future work
The services that we have implemented are not considered completed as they are,
and at the moment this thesis is written, there are already plans for improving the
various services by optimizing and extending their functionalities.
For example, while at the moment, NOC service is only partially integrated with
ServiceNow, the plan is to have a full API integration like it already happens OT
SOC, and this will be one of the first improvements that will be put in place. This
would allow for a better integration both in terms of efficiency and security.
Another improvement that we are planning to make is to optimize the asset man-
agement solution to expand the amount of data that can be gathered automatically
by various systems, and this development is ongoing with the various vendors and
suppliers currently part of the service itself.
Finally, regarding OT PCs, there are plans to ensure proper protection and
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management also for PCs that are not bought from the company itself, like devices
provided by machinery manufacturers together with the system they sell. These
devices are more challenging to reconfigure as they often have constraints such as
fixed IPs or policies to work with industrial machinery correctly. However, they
should be addressed and protected as much as possible.
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